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1. Introduction 
Protection of Civilians (PoC) is now well established as a policy realm 
within United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, its agencies as 
well as among non-UN actors (Holt and Taylor 2009). However, as 
demonstrated in the literature on PoC and in the present volume, there 
is no unified understanding of what PoC means and entails in practice 
(Lie and de Carvalho 2010). This report focuses on how protection 
issues are conceptualized and operationalized among international 
stakeholders in Bor, the state capital of Jonglei state in South Sudan, 
and analyses key challenges to the implementation and impact of pro-
tection initiatives on the ground1. Since most of the literature on PoC 
tends to provide UN headquarters perspectives from various levels,2 
the aim of the present study is to complement previous research by 
moving further down the protection chain and offering the perspec-
tives of actors operating in the immediate interface with vulnerable 
populations. These actors include the military and civilian components 
of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), various UN agen-
cies, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).3 
 
The PoC field in Bor has evolved as an important parameter to our 
broader understanding of the protection problematique, for several 
reasons. First, it adds another level of research to the protection chain. 
Second, it involves most of the relevant actors as found at higher lev-
els. Third, due to the remoteness and particularities of Bor, these ac-
tors operate more detached from their mother institutions at more cen-
tral headquarters levels. This context thus provides a privileged optic 
into the contextual application of the wider PoC sphere.  
 
Over the past decade, it appears to have become mandatory for the 
UN Security Council to include ‗protection language‘ when authoriz-
                                                 
1  Our original aim of approaching protection concerns from the protectee‘s point of view 
would have enabled us to see the interface of ideas and how they impinge each other as 
the PoC concept is transmitted through various headquarters onto the beneficiaries. How-
ever, upon arrival in Bor we realized that the area had not yet dried up after the rains, 
making visits outside the regional capital impossible due to muddy and inaccessible roads. 
This was also a challenge to the various protection actors operating out of Bor, who were 
prevented from travelling to the field during the rainy season (May to November). Most 
agencies therefore concentrated their activities in and around Bor, with less attention to 
the remoter and more marginalized areas of Jonglei state.  
2  This includes New York HQ and Country Office/mission level HQs. Solhjell‘s work on 
sexual and gender based violence and other protection-related issues in DRC (Solhjell 
2009) and Chad (Solhjell, Karlsrud and Lie 2010) are among the exceptions.  
3  While this report focuses on the role of international actors in PoC, the perceptions of the 
local authorities on the protection initiatives undertaken by international actors have also 
been included in our analysis. 
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ing new and extending existing peacekeeping missions.4 The phrase in 
Council resolutions ‗to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence‘ is now seen as a token for the missions being man-
dated for civilian protection under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
This language is broad and without explicit liabilities to any UN enti-
ties. As Victoria Holt asserts, ‗the authorisation for civilian protection 
is clear, but the Council‘s resolution leaves the decision to protect ci-
vilians up to the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), the Force Commander or another actor further down the 
chain to ―deem‖ it to be within the scope of ―its capabilities‖. What is 
not clear is if the capabilities, from the beginning, were deemed suffi-
cient to protect civilians or were planned to be so‘ (Holt 2005: 14). 
Hence, the inclusion of the protection language in mandates is no 
guarantee for civilian protection, nor does it contribute to clarify the 
understanding of protection or what it means and entails in practice.  
 
However, the handing over of responsibility for framing protection 
activities to the mission level might also be a way of ensuring greater 
contextualization, flexibility and success of protection efforts. Here 
there is a relevant parallel to Howard‘s work on UN peacekeeping 
(Howard 2008). In addressing the conventional understandings regard-
ing UN led peacekeeping operations‘ repeated failures, she attributes 
the potential success of such operations to the degree of autonomy the 
mission enjoys vis-à-vis its headquarters.5 With reference to our focus 
on protection, this reminds us that it is not enough to consult mandates 
when dealing with protection issues: mandates must be investigated as 
they are shaped and articulated in practice.  
1.1 Protection Concerns in South Sudan 
This study draws on field research conducted in Bor, Jonglei state, 
complemented by interviews with key protection stakeholders in Juba, 
the capital of South Sudan.6 Both contexts are characterized by the 
presence of international actors, and many of the protection activities 
pivot around UNMIS, which was established in response to the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the Government 
of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005. 
 
The peace agreement between the Arab-Islamist regime in Khartoum 
and the former insurgents in South Sudan marked an end to more than 
two decades of brutal civil war in the Sudan (see Johnson 2003; and 
                                                 
4  Since 1999 (to date), the UN Security Council has authorized ten peacekeeping operations 
with PoC mandates (see Holt and Taylor, 2009).   
5  The degree of autonomy can be an effect of the mission‘s intended architectural design, 
and of how the SRSG or mission head interprets the mandate, as well as his/her roles and 
functions. 
6  The field study was conducted in Jonglei and Juba in October 2010.  The data from the 
fieldwork has further been complemented by desk reviews.  
Challenges to Protection of Civilians in South Sudan: A Warning from Jonglei State 9 
Madut Jok 2007). The ultimate milestone of the CPA was reached 
with the implementation of the referendum, where an overwhelming 
majority of the south Sudanese people voted in favour of secession 
from the North. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan achieved its long await-
ed independence, and a few days later the UN General Assembly ad-
mitted the new state (the Republic of South Sudan) as the 193
rd
 Mem-
ber of the United Nations.  
 
Although the CPA formally came to an end with the secession of 
South Sudan, many contentious issues were left unresolved, and the 
coming period will thus be decisive for the future relations between 
the newly born state and its neighbour in the North. Failure by the par-
ties to reach agreements over the contested North-South (1.1.56) bor-
ders, Abyei area, oil and water resources, security arrangements7, and 
citizenship could have serious ramifications for peace and security in 
the region. The recent escalation of the security situation in Abyei and 
Southern Kordofan, including reports of mass atrocities by govern-
ment forces and aligned militia against the civilian population in these 
areas, do not only raise serious protection concerns, but could also un-
dermine the fragile peace process between the former warring parties8.  
 
The security and protection concerns in South Sudan, however, do not 
pertain solely to the North–South dispute, but are also related to inter-
nal tensions in the South9. In 2009, more than 2500 civilians, includ-
ing women and children, were killed in South Sudan as a result of in-
ter-tribal violence (see McEvoy and Le Brun, 2010). While UN re-
ports indicated a general reduction of violence throughout South  
Sudan in 2010, the situation has rapidly deteriorated following the ref-
erendum, mainly due to intensified struggles over power and re-
sources, as well as the re-surfacing of ethno-political rivalries. Further 
to a series of deadly tribal clashes during the first half of 2011, armed 
rebellions by discontented ex-militia and defected SPLA officers are 
now adding to the complexity of the security dynamics in South  
Sudan10.  
                                                 
 7  This includes the outstanding security arrangements for northern SPLA soldiers in South-
ern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, i.e. whether they should be redeployed to the South or 
integrated into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). While both states are located in North Su-
dan, parts of the population have strong historical, ethnic and political ties with the South. 
According to the CPA, popular consultations are to be held in both states to ascertain the 
‗will of the people‘ through a democratically elected legislature on shortcomings in the 
constitutional, administrative and political arrangements of the CPA. The SPLM and NCP 
have, however, decided that ‗the consultations would not be a referendum and therefore 
not lead to separation‘ (UNSG 2011b:2). With rising tensions between SPLM north and 
NCP at the state level, the popular consultations are, however, yet to be completed, and 
the ongoing fighting between SAF and northern SPLA soldiers in Southern Kordofan il-
lustrate the need for urgent solutions to these outstanding issues.  
 8  The militarization on both sides of the North-South border line is also considered to be a 
major security concern. An analysis of the North-South dynamics is, however, beyond the 
scope of this report.  
 9  While the grievances may differ, many of the local conflicts in South Sudan are also inter-
linked with conflicts at the national and regional level (see Sørbø 2010).  
10  In June 2011, the UN reported that more than 1400 civilians had been killed in South 
Sudan since the beginning of the year (see: http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idAFJOE75S0JA20110629). The armed uprisings in various locations in the South can be 
Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Jon Harald Sande Lie 10 
Jonglei state, located in the central part of South Sudan, has since the 
signing of the CPA been marked by violent inter-communal con-
flicts.11 While several of these conflicts have erupted as a result of tra-
ditional cattle-raiding practices and competition over resources (land, 
water and livestock), socio-economic grievances and legacies of the 
civil war, including ethno-political tensions, contested administrative 
and tribal borders, youth unemployment, erosion of traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms, lack of integration of former militias, and the 
proliferation of arms have further contributed to the complex security 
scenario. In many cases, these factors have in turn been manipulated 
by political actors at the local, state, and/or national levels for political 
and economic purposes. In 2009, more than 1000 civilians were killed 
and over 300 children abducted in Jonglei state in the course of a se-
ries of brutal attacks and counter-attacks between rivalling ethnic 
groups.12 These conflicts further demonstrated a shift from the more 
‗traditional‘ cattle raids to the increased targeting of women and chil-
dren. Following the general elections in 2010, the state has further be-
come one of the most serious battlegrounds for tribal conflicts and 
armed insurgencies in the region13.  
 
Adding to the protection scenario is the rise in food insecurity14 and 
flooding during the rainy season. Moreover, in view of the separation 
of the country and uncertain future for the approximately 1.5 million 
southerners in the North, hundreds of thousands displaced southerners 
in Khartoum and neighbouring countries are expected to return to the 
South, including Jonglei, which is likely to exacerbate protection con-
cerns on the ground (NRC 2010). Against this backdrop, there are se-
rious concerns that the security situation in South Sudan could further 
deteriorate following independence, with grave consequences for the 
safety and security of the civilian population.  
 
                                                 
seen in relation to political discontent as well as grievances within the security sector, in-
cluding the incomplete integration of former militias into the regular forces (see also ICG, 
2011). Many southerners, as well as observers, further believe the North is backing some 
of these insurgencies, including renewing its support to former southern militia proxies, in 
an effort to instigate instability and fragmentation in the South. Deadly incursions by the 
Ugandan rebels, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), into South Sudanese territory are also 
causes of insecurity and grave protection concerns.  
11  Inter-ethnic conflicts in Jonglei State are common between the Dinka, Murle and Lou 
Nuer. During the dry season, cross-border raids and clashes between the Jikany Nuer of 
Upper Nile and Lou Nuer of Jonglei, as well as between the Dinka Bor and Mundari of 
Central Equatoria, have also taken place. Inter-tribal clashes have also taken place along 
the border to Ethiopia. Moreover, intra-clan disputes erupt frequently among the Nuer and 
Dinka ethnic groups respectively (See also ICG, 2009). 
12  According to the Jonglei state government, in 2009, 1262 people were killed and 380 
children abducted in Jonglei state as a result of violent conflicts.  
13  After being defeated in the gubernatorial elections in April 2010, former SPLA Comman-
der, General George Athor, defected from the army (SPLA), and launched an armed in-
surgency in the Khorfulus area of Jonglei State.  He subsequently formed an umbrella re-
bel movement called South Sudan Democratic Movement. The government is further fa-
cing armed rebellions in a number of strategic areas of Unity State and Upper Nile State.  
14  The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) describes food security as a major protection 
concern in South Sudan. According to NRC, around 1.5 million people in the South are 
‗severely food insecure‘ (NRC, 2010). Few other actors in Jonglei and Juba, with the no-
table exception of the WFP, mentioned food security as a ―protection‖ concern.  
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Amidst these mounting security challenges, the Government of South 
Sudan (GoSS), who has primary responsibility for protecting the civil-
ian population, seems to lack capacity to fulfill this obligation. This 
has to a great extent been attributed to its weak and underdeveloped 
security and rule of law institutions.15 Due to poorly equipped police 
forces, the authorities have tended to turn to the army when interven-
ing in inter-communal conflicts and/or disarming the civilian popula-
tion. However, the deployment of unprofessional and poorly trained 
ex-guerrilla soldiers to villages has invariably resulted in harassment 
and abuses of the local population, in some cases culminating in vio-
lent confrontations between the SPLA and armed civilians. In several 
places, this has contributed to a deteriorating relationship between the 
SPLA and the civilian population, undermining the perceived credibil-
ity of the government and its ability to protect the citizenry16.  
 
Since the government seemingly lack the capacity to provide protec-
tion to the civilian population, the focus has tended to shift to the role 
and engagement of international actors in the protection sphere – as 
will be discussed in the below sections.  
1.2 Down the Protection Chain: from Policy to  
Practice 
The CPA marked not only the end to the civil war, but also the start of 
greater international engagement in Sudan. On 24 March 2005, the 
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was authorized under Se-
curity Council Resolution (SCR) 1590 to support the signatory parties, 
the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in implementing the CPA.17 UNMIS has 
a broad mandate. In terms of protection, the mission is to 
‗…contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote hu-
man rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts to-
wards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnera-
ble groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, 
and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close 
cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations‘ (UNSCR 1590 2005: 4d).18  
 
                                                 
15  This includes weak law enforcement agencies and judicial system.  Further to the statuto-
ry/modern judicial system, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (2005) recognizes 
customary law, including courts, through the local government system. However, a 
discussion of the challenges surrounding this parallel legal system is beyond the scope of 
this report.   
16  The ongoing counter-insurgency operation carried out by SPLA in Jonglei, Unity and 
Upper Nile states has resulted in reports of grave violations against the civilian population 
in these areas. This information has, however, been difficult to verify by the UN due to 
the SPLA imposed restrictions of movement on UNMIS.    
17  UNMIS‘ mandate (under SCR 1978 (2011) ended on 9 July 2011, and has been replaced 
by UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) (UNSCR 1996 (2011).  
18  UNMIS PoC mandate was further reinforced by subsequent Security Council Resolutions: 
SCR 1812 (2008), SCR 1870 (2009),SCR 1919 (2010) and SCR 1978 (2011).  
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While the overall mandate of UNMIS is in accordance with Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council also included a Chapter 
VII Clause relating to PoC, authorizing UNMIS to ‗take the necessary 
action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within 
its capabilities, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installa-
tions, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of 
United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment 
mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, 
and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of  
Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence‘ 
(ibid.: paragraph 16).19  
 
With mandates under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII, UNMIS is a 
dual mission (Holt and Taylor, 2009). The Chapter VI mandate focus-
es on supporting the implementation of the CPA, providing for the 
protection of civilians as a responsibility mainly by the civilian com-
ponent of the mission. The Chapter VII mandate authorizes the mis-
sion to ‗use force to protect itself, humanitarian workers, and civilians, 
without acknowledging the dilemmas and paradoxes such dualism 
would create for the mission‘ (ibid: 321). However, ‗the Council‘s de-
cision to include the Chapter VII clause in the mandate did not lead to 
changes in the mission concept, structure, or resources‘ (ibid: 332–
333). As will be argued below, the unresolved tension between the 
mission‘s overall mandate and its PoC mandate, further reflected by 
the conflicting conceptions between the UN Security Council on the 
one hand and the UN Secretariat and the mission on the other,20 has 
had serious implications for implementation of PoC on the ground.  
 
UNMIS is a multi-dimensional mission comprising civilian, police 
and military components under the leadership of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary General (SRSG). As of May 2011, the 
strength of the mission was 10418 uniformed and 4145 civilian per-
sonnel21. Mission headquarters is located in Khartoum, where the top 
civilian and military leadership of UNMIS is situated, including the 
SRSG and the Force Commander. In line with the CPA provisions for 
the establishment of a semi-autonomous government (GoSS) in the 
South, the mission includes a Regional headquarters-South in Juba, 
the capital of South Sudan. The South is divided into three sectors – 
                                                 
19  In relation to UNMIS Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate, paragraph 16 (pp 6) is most 
often referred to. Interestingly, SCR 1590 diverged from the Secretary General‘s report of 
31 January 2005 (UNSG 2005) which only recommended a Chapter VI mandate (see also 
Holt and Taylor, 2009).  
20  See Holt and Taylor, 2009, for an analysis of the tension between the UN Security Coun-
cil perception of UNMIS mandate on the one hand and the UN Secretariat/ UNMIS per-
ception on the other hand. 
21  Uniformed personnel include 9264 troops, 457 military observers, and 697 police officers. 
The authorized strength is 10,000 military personnel, including 750 military observers, up 
to 715 police and an appropriate civilian component. The civilian component include 
1018 internationals, 2797 locals, and 330 UN Volunteers. The civilian numbers are of 
March 2011 (see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/facts.shtml). 
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all with headquarters and a set of field offices – with military, police 
and civilian personnel deployed at all levels22.  
 
Since UNMIS also is an integrated mission, the Deputy SRSG Resi-
dent and Humanitarian Coordinator has overall responsibility for facil-
itating the coordination and coherence of activities between UNMIS 
and the other UN agencies organized under the umbrella of a UN 
Country Team.23 In the capacity as an integrated mission, the UNMIS 
Protection of Civilians (PoC) section – the first of its kind in any UN 
mission – was initially designated the ‗lead‘ for protection activities in 
Sudan. This entailed working with and coordinating the activities of 
all protection actors, including UN humanitarian actors and non-UN 
actors.24 With the introduction of the protection cluster to South Sudan 
in July 2010, the coordination of protection has, however, been re-
organized, as will be addressed under section 3 of this report25.  
 
In the context of South Sudan, the separate and at times conflicting 
mandates of the UN agencies on the one hand and the peacekeeping 
operation on the other has impeded the integration across the UN fam-
ily. The many challenges related to the concept of integration have 
further impacted on the development of a coherent PoC strategy. ‗PoC 
requires a collaborative effort across the UN system in any given con-
text. A contested model of integration, either on practical or principled 
grounds, means that a coherent protection strategy is less likely to 
emerge‘ (Holt and Taylor, 2009: 28). The range of perceptions of 
what protection means in theory and in practice, the disjuncture be-
tween mandate and its implementation, as well as ambiguity as to who 
are responsible – and how –for adopting, translating and implementing 
the protection framework, have had critical implications for the inter-
national community‘s operational approach to protection (Lie and de 
Carvalho 2008). As UNMIS is a multi-dimensional and integrated 
mission it involves a host of different actors, which in turn means a 
need for overarching harmonization and coordination efforts in order 
to establish coherence among these actors.  
 
Below we give an account of such discrepancies and processes per-
taining to international protection actors and activities in Bor in 
Jonglei state. As will be seen, the variety and complexity of actors to 
be harmonized under one umbrella served to exacerbate already latent 
                                                 
22  Sector I:  Greater Equatoria (HQ in Juba), Sector II: Greater Bahr Al Ghazal (HQ in 
Wau), and Sector III: Greater Upper Nile (HQ in Malakal).  
23  A mission becomes ‗integrated‘ when ‗the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordina-
tor (RC/HC) function is integrated with the peacekeeping operation through the appoint-
ment of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary- General responsible for the 
RC/HC function‘ (de Coning, 2010:2). 
24  See UN.‗The role of UNMIS Protection‘, http://protection.unsudanig.org/index.php?fid= 
role. 
25  The UNMIS PoC strategy, finalized in November 2010, further provides for the main-
streaming of PoC and dissolution of the PoC section. The strategy had, however, not been 
implemented on the ground by the time of our field study in South Sudan (see also Table 
1).  
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challenges to UNMIS in general and regarding PoC in particular: that 
is, the disjuncture between the mandate and intentions on the one side, 
and practices and effects on the other. In this, our findings corroborate 
previous research conducted at the mission – and regional HQ in 
Khartoum and Juba (Lie and de Carvalho 2008; see also Holt and  
Taylor 2009) on the lack of a shared definition and/or conceptual un-
derstanding of PoC among protection actors on the ground. However, 
although the structural challenges might be similar, the content of the 
findings differs. This may well be because protection actors in Bor, at 
the bottom of the PoC chain, are more remote from the policy pro-
cesses at the more central levels of Juba and Khartoum, while also 
closer to the operating environment and beneficiaries of protection 
initiatives.  
 
2. Perspectives from the Bottom of 
the PoC Chain – UNMIS in Bor, Jonglei 
State  
Our field study in Bor revealed numerous, occasionally conflicting, 
conceptions of protection among UNMIS staff members. These diver-
ging understandings could broadly be categorized into 1) physical pro-
tection, 2) legal/rights-based and humanitarian, 3) peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention, and 4) a broader development perspective. This 
corroborates previous research conducted by Lie and de Carvalho 
(2008) and Holst and Taylor (2009)26.  
 
Staff members commonly distinguished between physical protection, 
on the one hand, and the humanitarian and legal form of protection, in 
line with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Human Rights Law 
(HRL) and International Refugee Law (IRL), on the other. While the 
former was seen as the responsibility of UNMIS military, the latter 
was mainly associated with the UN and non-UN humanitarian mem-
bers of the protection cluster, including UNMIS Human Rights and 
PoC sections. However, we found no uniform understanding on the 
meaning of physical protection – whether it meant the use of lethal 
force, projection of force, deployment of troops to deter violence, 
and/or pre-emptive patrolling, or if it was related to military escorts 
and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.  
 
In the absence of a common definition on PoC, including a coherent 
strategy and operational guidelines, the concept of protection of civil-
ians, as formulated in the mandate, is perceived to be too abstract by 
actors in the field. Simple questions like ‗who should be protected – 
and from what or whom?‘ could not so easily be answered. How then 
does this lack of a definition and shared conceptual understanding im-
pact on the operationalization of PoC activities on the ground? 
2.1 UNMIS Civilian Units: Perceptions of their Role in PoC 
This lack of a common conception on PoC, including the absence of 
guidelines to clarify the division of responsibilities among the various 
UNMIS civilian sections, seemed to have led to confusing and some-
                                                 
26  See Lie and de Carvalho 2008 and Holt and Taylor 2009 for further analysis of their fin-
dings on the diverging conceptual understandings of PoC among UNMIS staff members 
in Juba and Khartoum. 
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times conflicting understandings among staff members over their ope-
rational roles in relation to PoC.  
 
The ‗non-traditional‘ protection actors among UNMIS civilian sec-
tions in Bor appeared uncertain about their own role in protection, and 
tended to defer responsibility to the military, as well as the UNMIS 
PoC, Child Protection, and Human Rights sections. Most sections, 
however, did recognize their regular activities as indirect forms of 
protection. Protection was not necessarily the means or goal of their 
activities, but could be seen as a desirable albeit an unintended effect 
of their actions. For instance, representatives of the Civil Affairs sec-
tion in Bor did not see an immediate link between their mandate and 
PoC, although recognizing that their support to the authorities and lo-
cal communities in promoting peace and reconciliation, including 
management of inter-communal conflicts, could be understood as pre-
ventive mechanisms to protect civilians. Moreover, the section‘s con-
textual knowledge and mapping/analysis of political – and conflict 
dynamics on the ground were considered as important tools used to 
inform and recommend courses of action to the mission leadership in 
efforts to prevent or deter local violence and conflicts. One Civil Af-
fairs officer in Bor, however, expressed frustration over the perceived 
weakness of the section‘s non – implementing mandate, including lack 
of resources to effectively support and follow up on local peacebuild-
ing initiatives. This, it was argued, was contributing to undermine 
Civil Affairs‘ impact on the ground. 27  
 
Similarly, UN Police personnel in Bor generally did not perceive 
themselves as key protection actors, due to their non-executive man-
date under Chapter VI. Instead, they would refer to UN military and 
UNMIS PoC as the main actors in PoC. Some UN Police officers 
nonetheless understood their regular mandated tasks – including capa-
city building support to South Sudan Police (training, advising, men-
toring, and monitoring), patrolling, and interaction with the local 
communities – as indirectly supporting the mission‘s overall protec-
tion efforts. Interestingly, most of the other units within UNMIS (both 
civilian and military) perceived both UN Police and Civil Affairs as 
important actors in the field of protection.  
                                                 
27  According to several UNMIS staff members, a significant amount of Civil Affairs‘ time 
was instead spent on logistical assistance to government officials, reporting, as well as 
‗fire fighting‘ work, in cooperation with the authorities and the mission leadership, to mit-
igate or deescalate a crisis. Most of the peace-conferences facilitated by the section were 
also seen to be ineffective and unsustainable, due to lack of implementation and follow up 
by relevant stakeholders. One Civil Affairs officer in Bor also noted that the cooperation 
and coordination with other UN (i.e. UNDP) and non-UN implementing partners had 
been weak. This could to a great extent be explained by internal bureaucracy, different 
mandates, organizational structures and priorities, as well as lack of mechanisms for such 
cooperation. While some staff members called for a stronger ‗implementing‘ role of Civil 
Affairs, the findings of an assessment (conducted by ACCORD) of UNMIS Civil Affairs‘ 
conflict management work (UNMIS 2010b), emphasise the importance of ‗limiting the 
role of Civil Affairs conflict management work to supporting, facilitating and advising, 
i.e. stopping short of implementing instead of, or on behalf of, local actors‘ (ibid: 3).  
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Human Rights staff members, whose protection mandate derived di-
rectly from the mission‘s original mandate (SCR 1590), saw their role 
in protection as different from the other sections, including the PoC 
section, due to the Human Rights section‘s legal framework and focus 
on the rights of the individual, rather than communities. In contrast, 
the PoC section, mandated to coordinate protection activities, under-
stood protection of civilians to be a joint responsibility of all UNMIS 
sections. However, similarly to Civil Affairs, both Human Rights and 
PoC sections found it difficult to deal with protection and human 
rights concerns in a substantial manner due to the perceived weak-
nesses in their mandates28. Moreover, in most cases, other considera-
tions within the mission mandate seemed to take precedence over PoC 
concerns.29  
 
UNMIS civilian sections (Civil Affairs, Human Rights, PoC) in Bor 
also identified understaffing and the lack of access to the remote areas, 
especially in the rainy season, as major obstacles to effective imple-
mentation of their mandates. Moreover, the restriction on movement, 
imposed by the SPLA to areas where military operations were ongo-
ing, was further impeding the mission‘s access to civilians at risk.  
 
There also appeared to be limited coordination and cooperation on 
PoC-related matters among the mission‘s various entities. While the 
distinction between the different sections working on protection could 
seem artificial due to their closely related mandates, the sections 
seemed to have compartmentalized themselves, concentrating on their 
specific day-to-day tasks so as to avoid stepping onto the others‘ turfs.  
 
These findings illustrate the apparent gap between the discourse at UN 
HQ in New York and the understanding and operationalization of PoC 
in the field. While most staff members in Bor acknowledged the im-
portance of PoC, only sections with a direct PoC mandate saw it as a 
priority in their daily tasks. The lack of a uniform understanding of 
PoC made cooperation and coordination between the various sections 
problematic. The non-implementing/executive mandates of the civil-
ian sections and UN Police, which in most cases limited their actions 
to observing, advising and reporting, might also have contributed to 
the tendency of some sections to undermine their own role in protec-
tion. All these challenges must be seen in relation to the lack of a co-
herent PoC strategy as well as clear operational guidelines as to the 
roles and responsibilities of the various sections.  
                                                 
28  While recognizing that UNMIS could use its offices to advocate at the higher level, Hu-
man Rights and PoC units perceived their work on protection to be limited to monitoring 
and reporting on matters of relevance to the mission mandate.  
29  Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor also describe the ‘human rights dilemma‘, as when the 
‗UN feels compelled to promote peace by working with those who may have unsatisfacto-
ry human rights records, while still retaining the role of an ―outside critic‖ of the same 
process‘ (Holt and Taylor, 2009:27). 
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2.2 Perceptions on the Role and Engagement of the Military 
in PoC  
Although being regarded as a critical actor in PoC, UNMIS military 
was commonly described by civilian actors in Bor, including local au-
thorities, as incapable of providing protection to the civilian popula-
tion in Jonglei state. This was attributed mainly to the perceived reluc-
tance of the military commanders to deliver on mandated PoC tasks, 
as well as the inadequate resources and capacities on the ground. Per-
ceived capability constraints included untrained and insufficient num-
ber of troops (i.e. 110 to 120 troops in Jonglei state, which is roughly 
half the size of the UK), inadequate equipment, limited flexibility and 
mobility of troops, as well as a general lack of contextual knowledge, 
language skills and interaction with the local communities. Military 
PoC-supporting initiatives were seen to be limited to showing pres-
ence, patrolling, protecting UN premises and staff, and in rare cases 
providing humanitarian escorts. Some assumed that such activities 
could have a deterrent effect, while others regarded these activities as 
nothing more than the regular monitoring and verification activities of 
the UNMIS military component. Moreover, most civilians believed 
the military was equipped only for a Chapter VI mandate, as initially 
planned by the UN Secretariat. Some UN civilian staff members even 
voiced doubts over whether the Chapter VII Clause on PoC had been 
accepted by the UNMIS military contingents.  
 
Overall, civilian protection actors and local government officials ex-
pressed considerable frustration over the UNMIS military, arguing 
there was no will or intention on the part of the military commanders 
to contribute to protection. And even if there had been such will 
among the commanders on the ground, they would have been un-
equipped for the assignment. Some even questioned the capacity of 
the military to protect its own premises and staff, referring to several 
incidents of burglaries in the UNMIS compound. The commanders 
were also seen to be bound hand and foot due to their inability to take 
decisions without approval from the higher command. As one UN 
staff member lamented: ‗If a convoy is attacked the military troops 
would not even be able to shoot back unless they have a ―go ahead‖ 
from the contingent commander.‘ The military side was therefore seen 
as merely symbolic, not an actual protection force.  
 
The perceived inability of UNMIS to enforce freedom of movement 
and make use of its mandate to protect civilians in areas where SPLA 
was conducting military operations had also become a source of dis-
content among humanitarian actors in Bor. Despite incoming reports 
of harassment against the civilian population in some of these loca-
tions, UNMIS was unable to secure access and protect the people, due 
to the SPLA-imposed restrictions on movement.30 As a UN staff 
                                                 
30  See also UN SG report on the Sudan, 31 December 2010 (UNSG 2010a). 
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member in Bor stated, ‗The government and the UN are seeing every-
thing through a security lens right now [ahead of the referendum and 
9. July]– anything else [including protection] is less prioritized.‘ 
2.3 UNMIS Military: Perceptions of their PoC Role 
Representatives from the military component of the mission in Bor – 
broadly categorized into the Indian military company (or Troop Con-
tributing Country troops – TCC)31 and military observers – described 
their core functions in accordance with the provisions under Chapter 
VI, notably to support implementation of the CPA. This entailed mon-
itoring and verifying the Ceasefire Agreement and its provisions. The 
TCC troops were further seen as responsible for providing force pro-
tection of UNMIS and UN personnel and assets, as well as ensuring 
the security and freedom of movement of personnel and facilitating 
humanitarian escorts. 
 
Unlike the TCC, UNMIS military observers are unarmed, and hence 
did not perceive their mandate to be within PoC‘s clause for Chapter 
VII. Instead, they understood their role in PoC to be more indirect and 
in line with their overall effort to support the peace process, through 
monitoring, patrolling, information gathering and interactions with the 
communities and the SPLA.  
 
In the military Rules of Engagement (ROE) – based on the conven-
tionnal doctrines of minimum use of force and proportionality – the 
PoC mandate (Rule No 1.9) reads: ‗Use of force, up to and including 
deadly force, to protect civilians, including humanitarian workers, un-
der imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local autho-
rities are not in a position to render immediate assistance, is author-
ized. When and where possible, permission to use force should be 
sought from the immediate superior commander‘ (p. A-2).32 Nonethe-
less, officers from the Indian military company in Bor seemed reluc-
tant to talk about their role in PoC. The sensitivity surrounding the 
military‘s role in PoC could possibly be related to the unresolved ten-
sion between the overall CPA supporting mandate and the PoC man-
date, combined with increased pressure and calls from the internation-
al community and the UN Security Council regarding the need for 
UNMIS military to make more efficient use of its capabilities to im-
plement its PoC mandate.  
 
In an attempt to translate the security aspect of PoC into practice, the 
UNMIS PoC Security Concept describes various scenarios when force 
is authorized, including rankings of the degree of threshold for inter-
                                                 
31  The Indian military contingent, including the Sector Commander, is located in Malakal, 
Sector HQ.  
32  See UNMIS Rules of Engagement for the Military Component of the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 29 April 2005.  
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vention based on the potential consequences for the overall CPA sup-
porting mandate of the mission33. ‗Obviously, the threshold for decid-
ing on UNMIS‘ armed intervention will increase in view of the ex-
pected seriousness of consequences for UNMIS‘ overall mandate‘ 
(UNMIS 2009: 5).34 Hence, the mission is less likely to use force to 
protect civilians if this could have serious consequences for the overall 
mandate of the mission. The highest threshold for intervention would 
be when major combatants of the CPA signatories are involved, while 
the lowest threshold would be when individuals or gangs are con-
cerned. In scenarios involving militias and tribal fighters, the interven-
tion threshold would be somewhere in the middle. However, the PoC 
Security Concept, by falling short of being a military doctrine with 
clear operational instructions, remains open to interpretation by the 
military leadership and commanders on the ground.  
 
In Bor, the provisions in the PoC Security Concept did not seem to 
have been internalized or operationalized by the military component. 
For instance, while the Security Concept provides for intervention of 
on-the-scene commanders encountering a situation where civilians are 
under threat, the military commanders in the field remained fully de-
pendent on instructions from the national contingent commander at 
sector HQ in Malakal, before any action could be executed. The na-
tional contingent commander would in many cases further need to 
await instructions from his or her capital prior to an intervention. Ac-
cording to one military officer, there was no room for manoeuvre, as 
they were ‗only following orders‘.  
 
In the absence of clear operational instructions as to when and how to 
react to a situation of ‗imminent threat‘ against civilians, the conse-
quences of acting are perceived to be more severe than refraining from 
taking any action. This also has to be seen in relation to the complex 
operating environment, where the distinction between victim and per-
petrator is often blurred. The apparent reluctance to take action has 
further been attributed the mindset of military commanders in light of 
the instructions received from their respective capitals prior to and 
during deployment – ‗the national caveats that the TCC put on the op-
erations of their contingents [are] restricting them from fulfilling their 
roles assigned to them in the concept of operations‘ (Holt and Taylor, 
2009: 203).  
 
                                                 
33  The PoC Security Concept was developed by UNMIS Force HQ in 2009. The paper ex-
plores the ‗freedoms, constraints, expectations, and options available to the mission‘ in re-
lation to the security aspect of PoC ‗under imminent threat of physical violence‘ (UNMIS 
2009: 3). 
34  The paper provides a practical example of this: ‗intervention against combatants who owe 
their allegiance to CPA signatories and/or are operating under the control of a recognized 
branch of government (s) has a higher risk of negatively affecting the implementation of 
the UNMIS mandate than an intervention against independent tribal fighters‘ (UNMIS 
2009: 5).  
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A military intervention to protect civilians under imminent threat re-
mains therefore in the hands of the national contingent commander 
and the mission leadership (e.g. the SRSG and Force Commander). 
The Force Commander‘s actual command and control of the TCC, 
however, remains limited to the TCC capitals‘ intent and commitment 
to implement the PoC mandate. Hence, the absence of clear operation-
al instructions, complicated chain of command and the prevailing 
mindset of the TCC commanders have arguably contributed to under-
mine timely and appropriate responses to protect civilians at risk.  
 
It must also be asked: do we expect UN peacekeepers to go to ‗war‘ 
with the very state that has consented to their presence? From a tacti-
cal perspective, the TCC troops would be militarily inferior to any Su-
danese armed group. From a political and strategic perspective, an 
armed intervention without the consent of one of the CPA signatory 
parties could have repercussions for relations between the host gov-
ernment and the TCC, including the mission as a whole.35 This could 
further have implications for the perceived impartiality of the mission. 
Furthermore, this must be seen in relation to the tensions within the 
dual mandate of the mission, where UNMIS‘ overall CPA supporting 
mandate seems to take precedence over PoC when the military is to 
take decisions on a possible intervention. These dilemmas are, how-
ever, not reflected in the mandate and discourse at the UN Security 
Council level, where PoC is used to legitimize or explain the rationale 
for mission deployment, hence raising the expectations among the 
host government and local communities. However, without the neces-
sary resources and political backing by the UN Member States, the 
peacekeepers will not be able to meet these expectations.  
 
According to one senior UN official at the Juba level, the Security 
Council had created false expectations as to the capacities of the TCC 
troops. In reality, for political and economic reasons, the Member 
States were not committed to invest the necessary resources or per-
sonnel required for a Chapter VII mission. As argued by the UN offi-
cial:  
 
If [the mission] is to provide physical protection, there needs to be a force cap-
able of this. For UNMIS [which lacks the required resources and capacities on 
the ground] it would have been better not to have troops at all as the expectations 
would then not have been so high. The international community, as well as the 
host government and the local communities, would then have known the core 
purpose of the mission [Chapter VI, support to the CPA]. It is better to be realis-
tic so we can move forward. There is further a need to sit down and define these 
[PoC] responsibilities.  
 
                                                 
35  The UN Capstone Doctrine, distinguishing between use of force at strategic and tactical 
level, also recognizes that the UN is not well positioned to project force at the strategic 
level (UN 2008).  
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This confirms the prevailing gap between the UN Security Council‘s 
mandate, conception, and expectations of PoC – and the realities on 
the ground. In his report on the protection of civilians in armed con-
flict (UNSGa, 2009), the UN Secretary-General called for clear direc-
tions from the Security Council on how missions are to protect civil-
ians, noting that this would ideally ‗be informed by a realistic assess-
ment of what is possible based on consultations with the Secretariat, 
troop and police contributors and other stakeholders. [..] Currently 
there remains a disconnect between mandates, intentions, expecta-
tions, interpretations and real implementation capacity‘ (UNSGa, 
2009: 11). Moreover, as concluded by Holt and Taylor, ‗the presumed 
‗chain‘ of events to support PoC – from earliest planning, to Security 
Council mandates, to implementation of mandates by peacekeeping 
missions in the field, is broken‘ (Holt and Taylor, 2009: 5).  
 
In light of the global financial climate and reluctance by Western 
Member States to contribute with their own troops to peacekeeping 
operations in Africa, these challenges are unlikely to be resolved in 
the near future. How can then peacekeepers improve their capabilities, 
within the limitations of the current political and financial realities, to 
protect civilians short of using lethal force?  This question appears to 
have been absent from the debate on PoC36. 
 
In an attempt to explore the options available to the mission, the 
UNMIS PoC Security Concept has identified a four-phase approach to 
PoC.37 Here the use of physical force, seen as the ultimate resort, is 
identified as one of several measures UNMIS can take to prevent vio-
lence against civilians. Other measures, short of using lethal force, in-
clude conflict prevention, monitoring, early warning mechanisms, de-
ployment of forces and pre-emptive patrolling. While some of these 
measures have been implemented through the Jonglei Stabilization 
plan38, including civilian–military patrols, the impact has been limited 
– mainly due to lack of commitment and pro-activeness among the 
military component to support these efforts. The lack of formal coor-
dination mechanisms between the military company and the civilian 
leadership at the field level (as in Bor) has further impeded integrated 
mission approaches to PoC.  
                                                 
36  The New Horizon initiative calls for a capability- driven approach to ―improve the per-
formance of peacekeeping on the ground by linking clear operational tasks and standards 
with capacity-building and training programmes, equipment and support needs, and, as 
appropriate, incentives to deliver mandated tasks‖ (UN 2010: 6).  Discussions on how mi-
litary peacekeepers can protect civilians without using lethal force appear, however, to be 
missing from the overall debate.   
37  These are assurance, pre-emption, intervention, and consolidation (see UNMIS 2009).  
38  Some of the priorities in the Jonglei Stabilization plan included technical and logistical 
assistance to the State, enhanced presence and visibility across Jonglei State, integrated 
Long Range Patrols in critical areas, humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups, and 
capacity building of the South Sudan Police Service. Further to the above, the plan is to 
provide for the standing capacity of joint Long Range Patrols and joint Temporary Opera-
tion Bases to facilitate rapid deployment, in the event of violence and/or high risk of con-
flict, to areas throughout South Sudan.  
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Moreover, the apparent reluctance of the UNMIS leadership to chal-
lenge the SPLA and make use of its mandate in order to facilitate ac-
cess to the civilian population in areas where the SPLA has imposed 
restrictions on movement can be seen as a reflection of the tensions 
within the dual mandate of the mission. As illustrated in the above 
analysis, if intervention means compromising UNMIS relations with 
one of the signatory parties, and hence impeding its ability to support 
the peace process, the core political mandate of the mission will gene-
rally take precedence over the Chapter VII clause to protect civilians 
under imminent threat. Apart from the obvious tension within the 
mandate of the military component of the mission (with direct man-
dates under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII), the conflicting man-
date of the mission is further reflected within the civilian component, 
as represented by the political sections on the one hand and the hu-
manitarian sections on the other hand.  
 
Importantly, the restrictions on the movement of UNMIS further shed 
light on the failure of the UNMIS leadership, from the onset of the 
mission, to enforce its freedom of movement in accordance with the 
security provisions of the CPA. While this can partly be explained by 
the mission‘s desire to maintain good relations with the government, 
including the SPLA, it must further be seen in relation to the inherent 
weaknesses of many UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, including 
those in Darfur and Ivory Coast.39 
 
Despite these challenges, most representatives from the humanitarian 
community believed the added value of UNMIS in the protection 
sphere was to provide physical protection through military means. 
Physical protection was thus seen as UNMIS main contribution to pro-
tection – although the resources and capabilities of the military troops 
on the ground were seen as insufficient for this task. 
 
                                                 
39  See for instance S/2010/543 (UNAMID) (UNSG 2010 b) and S/2011/5 (UNOCI) (UNSG 
2011a). 
3. PoC versus Protection 
Until recently, UNMIS PoC unit functioned as the link between 
UNMIS on the one hand and the UN and non-UN agencies on the  
other hand in relation to the protection of civilians. However, despite 
the set-up of various coordination mechanisms, unity of effort be-
tween UNMIS and the humanitarian community has proven problem-
atic for several reasons. These include: conflicting mandates (political/ 
security versus humanitarian/human rights), lack of a common defini-
tion and understanding of protection, as well as the absence of a holis-
tic protection strategy. Because of these challenges, the various pro-
tection actors have tended to act on behalf of their respective man-
dates, instead of harmonizing and targeting their protection activities 
towards assessed needs. As a result, the impact of protection activities 
on the ground has been limited.  
3.1 Protection Cluster: Humanitarian Country Team  
Following the introduction of the cluster approach to South Sudan and 
the subsequent establishment of the protection cluster in July 2010, 
the coordination of protection has been re-organized.40 The Cluster, 
led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)41 and co-led by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC),42 
is now responsible for coordinating the protection activities of the 
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).43 The protection cluster is meant 
to strengthen rather than replace the existing sectoral coordination 
mechanisms under the overall leadership of the Humanitarian Coordi-
nator. The role of UNHCR, as the protection cluster lead, is to facili-
tate a process aimed at ensuring coordinated and effective humanitari-
an responses in relation to protection. UNHCR is further required to 
be the ‗provider of last resort‘ (i.e. filling the gap) when necessary, 
and where ‗access, security and availability of resources make this 
possible‘ (IASC, 2006: 7).  
 
                                                 
40  In April 2010 the cluster approach was formally introduced in seven emergency sectors in 
Southern Sudan. Each cluster is co-led by a UN agency and an NGO.  
41  The UNHCR is also the Global Cluster Lead (see IASC, 2006). 
42  The NRC is not present in Jonglei State, but has offices in Juba (country office), Aweil 
and Yei (field offices). The focus of the NRC in Southern Sudan is on emergency capaci-
ty, return and capacity building. It is also working on legal assistance and land conflicts 
(through the ICLA project) and IDP protection.   
43  This includes UN humanitarian agencies, other inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations and relevant government counterparts. In states where the cluster approach 
has not been activated there will be equivalent coordination by the protection sector. 
However, the ICRC does not take part in the cluster approach. It has stated that: ‗coordi-
nation between the ICRC and the UN will continue to the extent necessary to achieve 
efficient operational complementarity and a strengthened response for people affected by 
armed conflict and other situations of violence‘ (IASC, 2006: 1).  
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This re-organization is believed to have resulted in a clearer distinc-
tion between the humanitarian community and UNMIS in terms of 
protection of civilians. Given the conflicting mandates between the 
mission and humanitarian community, most UN and non-UN humani-
tarian actors thus appeared more comfortable with this solution.44A 
senior UN official in Juba even went beyond the organizational dis-
tinction, arguing there was a conceptual distinction between PoC and 
protection. According to this official, the former relates specifically to 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and peacekeep-
ing missions, while the latter is to be understood in terms of the tradi-
tional humanitarian perspective on protection, represented by the pro-
tection cluster. The UN official further argued that UNMIS had a 
more narrow approach to protection than the protection cluster, due to 
the former‘s specific mandate to provide physical protection to civil-
ians under imminent threat.  
 
The conceptual understanding of protection, however, seemed to dif-
fer between the various humanitarian organizations operating in South 
Sudan, and the protection cluster had therefore failed to reach agree-
ment on a common definition on protection. In the meantime, the clus-
ter had employed the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defi-
nition45. Some humanitarian actors described the definition as too 
broad and abstract, arguing that it could result in a loss of focus as 
‗everything becomes protection‘, thus making coordination and har-
monization of efforts more challenging. This dilemma was further il-
lustrated by the protection cluster working group in Bor46, where the 
agenda was structured according to differing notions of protection, 
which included physical and legal protection of refugees, returnees 
and IDPs; rule of law; child protection; sexual and gender-based vio-
lence; and land, property and housing issues. Other protection-related 
issues, like food security, non-food items, service delivery, peace-
building, and security were left out, and instead covered by separate 
clusters (as with food security and non-food items), or by develop-
ment-oriented agencies (i.e. UNDP) and UNMIS. UNHCR in Bor, 
however, stressed that protection was a cross-cutting domain, underly-
ing the activities of all the sectors.  
 
Members of the protection cluster working group in Bor mainly saw 
the meeting as an arena for exchanging information and reports on 
protection-related matters – without questioning each other‘s diverg-
ing and sometimes conflicting notions of protection. Limited attention 
                                                 
44  See also NRC and IDMC (2010). 
45  IASC definition of protection: ‗all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of 
the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. 
human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)‘. 
46  These findings are based on our observation of a protection cluster working group mee-
ting in Bor on 21 October 2010, and minutes from previous meetings. Participants in the 
meeting included various UN agencies, UNMIS civilian sections, INGOs, various go-
vernment ministries and local police officers.   
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was given to practical solutions: most of the Action Points were relat-
ed to the dissemination of reports and debriefings on assessment mis-
sions. This appeared to have resulted in some discontent among the 
participants from the government side, and during the meeting on 21 
October 2010, one government official called for more focused and 
structured discussions to allow more time for practical recommenda-
tions as to the way forward. 
 
Discussions among the participants at the meeting further revealed the 
absence of a shared understanding of protection, yet ‗protection‘ was 
what had brought them together. Perceptions differed within the hu-
manitarian community, as well as between the humanitarian commu-
nity and the government. In general, the actors seemed to perceive 
protection against the backdrop of the institution they represented and 
would mainly engage in discussions related to their specific field of 
work. For instance, while sexual and gender-based violence was iden-
tified as one of the five thematic areas on the agenda, none of the 
agencies seemed to pay much attention to the matter, as none of them 
had a direct mandate on the issue. Instead of regarding it as an integral 
part of protection, sexual and gender-based violence was further de-
scribed by some protection actors as a niche field, distinct from the 
overall protection mandate47. 
 
Hence, while the UNHCR sought to mainstream protection through 
the protection cluster, our findings indicate a lack of shared under-
standing among the various humanitarian actors as regards protection. 
The broad IASC ‗umbrella‘ definition of protection, covering a wide 
range of activities, does not seem to have clarified the concept or its 
meaning in practice. Furthermore, in line with our findings among 
UNMIS civilian sections, only agencies with a direct protection man-
date considered their role in protection to be significant. Others with a 
more indirect mandate, like WFP, did not perceive any immediate link 
between the core mandate of the agency and protection, and hence de-
emphasized their significance.  
 
This must be seen in relation to the lack of a coherent protection clus-
ter strategy, as well as the absence of a common understanding of the 
methodologies, standards and indicators to be used in identifying pro-
tection concerns and in implementing activities. The dual task of the 
protection cluster was further seen as a challenge to effective harmoni-
zation of activities. On the one hand, the cluster lead was responsible 
for building a synergetic, comprehensive and integrated protection re-
sponse; on the other hand, the protection cluster had to ensure effec-
tive specialized protection responses through focal point agencies.  
                                                 
47  The common denotation among the international actors was sexual/gender based violence 
(S/GBV), but due to the political sensitivity surrounding the issue, some INGOs had re-
cently been requested to remove the ‗S‘ from the language. We were, however, informed 
that this was rather a matter of rhetoric than practice.  
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Judging from our meetings with protection cluster members in Jonglei 
state, the methodologies used in inter-agency assessments missions 
appeared heavily dependent on the individual team leader and compo-
sition of the team, and not on standardized approaches. Sometimes 
participatory assessments were conducted, but the time constraints 
(often due to tight deadlines imposed by donors) frequently hindered 
the protection cluster in carrying out comprehensive protection assess-
ments. Most of these missions were therefore conducted in an ad hoc 
manner, often at the expense of including the perspectives of women, 
who were seen to be less accessible than men in the villages.  
 
Thus, the UNHCR, as well as other agencies and organizations, have 
often had to implement projects without any prior assessments on the 
ground. This adds to the challenges related to the various actors‘ 
tendencies to implement protection activities according to their own 
mandate, without taking into account the real needs of the civilian 
population they are supposed to be targeting.48  
 
Most international actors operating out of Bor seemed to recognize the 
importance of a holistic and concerted approach to protection. Yet, 
there were limited junctures and structures that could facilitate such a 
comprehensive approach. In general, there appeared to be limited in-
teraction and dialogue between UNMIS and the humanitarian and de-
velopment actors in the field. In most cases, the lines of communica-
tion and information sharing went through their respective regional 
offices in Juba. The monthly meeting of the protection cluster working 
group was considered to be among the most important arenas for in-
teraction between various agencies. However, since this was a work-
ing-level meeting, the senior leadership of UNMIS and UN agencies 
did not attend. Moreover, the limitations of the agenda excluded key 
protection actors. While some specialized UN agencies and INGOs 
appeared to have developed bilateral relations with UNMIS PoC, Hu-
man Rights, and UN Police, there was less interaction between the 
humanitarian community and the remaining sections at UNMIS, in-
cluding the civilian leadership and the military. This in turn led to a 
general lack of understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the 
other actors.49 
  
Some UN staff members argued that that the separation of the protec-
tion cluster from UNMIS PoC and development actors had contribut-
                                                 
48  During our field study in Southern Sudan, UNHCR in Juba was in the process of develo-
ping methodologies and a systematic framework for Protection Cluster needs assessments. 
This was to improve the standardization and coherence of assessment missions carried out 
by cluster members in the field. Moreover, as part of the South Sudan Protection Cluster 
Needs Assessment, the Protection Cluster published a report in January 2011, presenting 
an analysis of data collected from interviews and focus groups in 13 payams from 7 Sep-
tember – 27 November 2010 (see http://southsudanprotectioncluster.org/2011/01/rna-
data- analysis/). The Needs Assessment is also intended to function as the basis for a pro-
tection cluster strategy in South Sudan.  
49  See also Holt and Taylor, 2009. 
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ed to undermine the coordination and harmonization of protection ac-
tivities across the humanitarian, development, and political/security 
nexus – as there was no formal interface between the two pillars. One 
UN staff member pointed out: ‗right now there are two ways to ap-
proach protection in South Sudan: the military and the humanitarian 
way, but there is no correlation between the two‘. Many felt that the 
lack of an integrated approach had negatively impacted on the imple-
mentation of protection activities on the ground.  
 
Hence, whereas most protection actors recognized the need for a com-
bined effort across the whole spectrum of the UN family and partners 
in order to address protection concerns adequately in Jonglei state, the 
lack of guidelines and a coherent protection strategy remained key ob-
stacles to an integrated approach. Although this can partly be ex-
plained by the diverging conceptual and operational understandings of 
protection, as well as the different organizational structures, heavy UN 
bureaucracy, limited flexibility, and turf battling, it should also has be 
seen in relation to the conflicting mandates between UNMIS and the 
humanitarian community, including the perceived threats to the ‗pro-
tection space‘.  
3.2  UNMIS’ Multi-dimensionality – Curtailing the  
Humanitarians’ Protection Space  
Among those interviewed, there was a general concern that the politi-
cal and military aims and means of the peacekeeping mission could 
have repercussions for humanitarian operations and their core humani-
tarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. The 
blurred distinction between the roles of the military and humanitarian 
organizations is widely seen as a threat to humanitarian space, as it 
may compromise the neutrality of humanitarian actors (see Slim 
2001).  
 
The humanitarian space is linked to a protection space, defined as ‗an 
environment sympathetic to international protection principles and 
enabling their implementation to the benefit of those entitled to pro-
tection‘ (UNHCR, 2009: 5). According to Assistant High Commis-
sioner of UNHCR, Erica Feller, ‗maintaining the neutrality and inde-
pendence of humanitarian action in the context of an ever stronger 
drive towards integrated approaches combining political, military, 
humanitarian, and development strategies, is a constant challenge‘. 
Moreover, the High Commissioner for Refugees has ‗labelled the 
shrinking of humanitarian space as UNHCRs biggest concern at the 
moment‘ (ibid.: 2).  
 
In light of these perceived challenges, the IASC has recommended 
future integrated missions to develop guidelines on civilian–military 
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coordination (IASC, 2008). In Bor, humanitarian actors expressed 
concerns over the perceived blurring of activities between UNMIS 
and the humanitarian agencies, complaining that the local population 
and the government no longer recognized the differences between the 
‗blue‘ UN (UN agencies) and ‗black‘ UN (UN peacekeeping opera-
tion). This was particularly worrisome when military actors performed 
activities of a humanitarian nature. Others were critical to the presence 
of civilian protection sections (like PoC, Human Rights and Child 
Protection Unit) under the mission structure, arguing that this further 
contributed to the perceived politicization of humanitarian action.  
 
At the same time, given the complex security environment in conflict 
and post-conflict situations, most humanitarian actors today have rec-
ognized the need for political and military actors in the humanitarian 
sphere. For instance, the ICRC has emphasized the importance of es-
tablishing an interface between the diverse protection actors to ensure 
effective protection, including political and security actors, despite the 
different ‗principles, policies and practices, competencies, and re-
sources‘ (ICRC 2009: 33)  
 
In South Sudan, the humanitarian community has called upon UNMIS 
to assume a far more active role in protecting civilians, even if this 
should require the use of physical force. Moreover, several humanitar-
ian actors in South Sudan indeed described UNMIS‘ added value in 
terms of its ability to provide robust protection, as no other UN agen-
cy or INGO could take on this task. Nobody contested UNMIS‘ in-
volvement in PoC as long as it limited its activities to physical protec-
tion by the military. However, because UNMIS is a multi-dimensional 
and integrated mission, the operations of the military side of UNMIS 
intrinsically affect other agencies, non-military as well as non-UN. 
This, then, ‗…reflects a deeper moral paradox around the use of force. 
This paradox is the old one that the best way to stop violence might be 
to use it‘ (Slim 2001: 326).  
 
The outwardly ‗artificial‘ distinction between ‗protection‘ and ‗PoC‘ 
might therefore be seen as an attempt by humanitarian actors to re-
solve this dilemma by preserving the boundaries between the mission 
and the humanitarian community. While recognizing UNMIS‘ role 
and responsibility in physical protection, the same agencies would 
emphasize their non-interaction with the military component of the 
mission. Most humanitarian organizations were further reluctant to 
use UNMIS military escorts, for fear of potential negative implica-
tions for the ‗humanitarian space‘. Despite their reluctance to be asso-
ciated with UNMIS, most agencies nonetheless stressed their satisfac-
tion with the logistical support (i.e. airlifts) of the mission, which faci-
litated the movement of personnel and humanitarian assistance to lo-
cations not accessible by road. This form of cooperation with the mis-
sion was regarded as a necessity in order to reach populations in need, 
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and was not seen to be compromising the humanitarian principles of 
the organizations.  
 
While many theorists have contested the notion of ‗humanitarian 
space‘ due to its inapplicability in practice (see Keen, 1994), some 
have gone even further, arguing that the perceived threat to ‗humani-
tarian space‘ is in reality the intervention of other non-traditional ac-
tors into the humanitarian arena, rather than the desire to uphold hu-
manitarian principles per se. According to Hilhorst and Janson, ‗the 
language and principles of humanitarian space are strategically or tac-
itly used by different actors to advance or legitimize their respective 
interests, projects or beliefs‘ (Hilhorst and Janson, 2010: 1118). More-
over, ‗actors use humanitarian principles strategically to gain access to 
the arena or to discredit competitors‘ (ibid: 1123). One INGO staff 
member in Bor also disputed the ‗humanitarian space‘ argument used 
by many humanitarian workers, pointing out the need to distinguish 
South Sudan from Darfur – where humanitarian personnel had be-
come direct targets in the conflict. In South Sudan the violence was 
not targeted at international workers, and threats to ‗humanitarian 
space‘ in the South and in Darfur were thus not comparable.  
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Table 1.  UNMIS PoC Strategy 
In recognition of the paramount challenges facing the mission as 
regards effective operationalization of PoC, UNMIS finalized its 
long-awaited PoC strategy in November 2010.50 The mission-wide 
strategy provides for a more holistic approach to PoC, and includes 
a range of civilian and military activities – from political dialogue, 
conflict resolution and physical protection, to human rights and le-
gal reform (UNMIS 2010a).51 With an aim to mainstream and inte-
grate PoC into the overall political goal of the mission, the PoC sec-
tion will further be dissolved and incorporated into other civilian 
sections. While the Principle Deputy SRSG will be responsible for 
joint planning and coherence of protection efforts across the UN 
family at the regional level, the interface between UNMIS PoC and 
the protection cluster in the field remains to be clarified. During our 
field visit, initial reactions to the strategy among UN staff in Juba 
and Bor appeared to be mixed. While some maintained it would 
probably result in a greater focus on PoC within UNMIS, as well as 
improved coordination among the various mission components, oth-
ers believed PoC would be de-prioritized, given the ‗inappropriate‘ 
timing, the dissolution of the PoC section, and the lack of opera-
tional guidelines on how to translate the strategy into activities on 
the ground. Since nearly all mission activities now could be classi-
fied as PoC, some also found the PoC strategy to be too broad and 
non-specific. Hence, instead of ensuring more effective implemen-
tation of PoC, the strategy could lead to a lack of focus and prioriti-
zation of tasks (e.g. similar to the IASC definition of protection)52  
 
 
                                                 
50  The development of the new strategy is in line with SCR 1919 (2010) which ‗calls upon 
UNMIS to implement a mission-wide protection strategy, comprehensively throughout 
the mission area, including the implementation of tribal conflict resolution mechanisms, 
and urges UNMIS to enhance its presence in areas of high risk of localized conflict, in-
cluding by conducting frequent patrols‘.  
51  In line with the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on PoC (2010), UNMIS strategy is ba-
sed on a three-tiered approach: 1) protection through political prevention (monitoring, ve-
rification and early warning, as well as conflict prevention through political advocacy and 
engagement with the government); 2) protection from physical violence (political mitiga-
tion and conflict resolution initiatives supported by the projection of force); and 3) estab-
lishment of a protective environment (through advocacy, legal reform and capacity buil-
ding of state institutions).  
52  As the strategy was finalized only recently (during our field visit), it would be premature 
to offer an extensive analysis of its potential implications on the ground. The PoC strategy 
will also need to be revised following 9 July 2011, with the deployment of the new peace-
keeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and in line with the new Security Council 
mandate (UNSCR 1996 (2011)).  
4. Are Protection Initiatives  
Appropriate? 
The international community in Jonglei state had varying perceptions 
as to the appropriateness of the protection activities carried out by 
UNMIS and other UN and non-UN actors. Some protection actors 
claimed the international community was taking the needs and con-
cerns of the local communities into account through ‗participatory‘ 
needs assessments. The concept of ‗participation‘ was, however, inter-
preted variously. While many acknowledged the need to include 
women and youth to a greater extent, there did not appear to be a sys-
tematic approach to ensure that their voices would be taken into con-
sideration. 
 
Meanwhile, others questioned the procedures used by international 
protection actors in identifying ‗protection concerns‘, and believed 
there was a general lack of understanding of the local context, cultural 
beliefs and values of the local population. It was argued that the inter-
national community‘s perception of protection mainly derived from 
preconceived Western discourses and international conventions, often 
resulting in ‗ethnocentric‘ initiatives. These initiatives, it was held, did 
not necessarily reflect the local community‘s perceptions of the most 
immediate concerns and needs. For instance, in South Sudan, tradi-
tional conceptions as to what constitutes a ‗child‘ often deviated from 
the Western perspective. While a person below the age of 18 was le-
gally considered a child by the Child Act, in South Sudan a 16-year-
old girl or boy was old enough to marry and have children. One pro-
tection officer further remarked: ‗Protection of girls is considered to 
be an irrelevant matter among the local communities. Even the women 
do not understand the importance of this issue. In many communities 
in Jonglei, women are regarded as property, and domestic violence is 
not considered to be major concern.‘53 
 
Cattle raiding, identified as a key protection concern by most interna-
tional staff members in Bor, was also believed to have different con-
notations among the local communities. As one UN staff member not-
ed, ‗Cattle raiding is not always seen as an offence or crime by the lo-
cal communities. Instead it is a deep-rooted traditional activity prac-
tised for centuries, and is related to the practices of dowry and polyg-
amy, including regulated mechanisms for compensations between the 
parties concerned‘. These seemingly different conceptual understand-
                                                 
53  Although sexual/gender based violence was believed to be common in many households, 
no studies had been conducted on this matter in Jonglei State as per November 2010. 
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ings of protection between the local communities and the international 
protection actors had, according to several protection actors, under-
mined the implementation and impact of protection activities.  
 
While this forms part of the picture, it should, however, be borne in 
mind that traditional values and practices are never static – they adapt 
according to the changing environment. The ‗traditional practice‘ of 
cattle raiding has been politicized and ‗criminalized‘ with the civil 
war, and is regularly associated with inter-clan/ethnic fighting, the ab-
duction of women and children, power struggles and competition for 
resources. With the proliferation of arms, as well as the erosion of tra-
ditional power structures and conflict resolution mechanisms, the bal-
ancing system for compensations has further been lost, resulting in 
violent spirals of revenge killings between rivaling tribes54. Women 
and children have also increasingly become the targets of violence 
during cattle-raiding incidents. To judge from informal talks with 
community members in Bor and other areas in the South,55 these deve-
lopments – including cattle raids, tribal conflicts, rapes and abductions 
of children and women – were indeed perceived as major threats to 
their safety and security. This perspective was reiterated by the local 
authorities in Bor, further calling for enhanced focus by the interna-
tional community on long-term development and peacebuilding pro-
grammes to address the root causes of the protection concerns.  
 
However, up to now, engagement by the international community to 
deal with these concerns, including structural causes of the violence, 
appears to have been absent at worst, and ad hoc at best. As extensive-
ly discussed in the above sections, for a number of reasons, UNMIS 
has not been able to effectively utilize its PoC mandate to protect civi-
lians from these threats (i.e. cattle raids and tribal violence, including 
sexual and gender based violence and child abductions). Further to its 
support to peace – and political processes at the national level, UN 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations also have a critical role to 
play in peacebuilding and conflict management at the local level56. 
                                                 
54  The government has been trying to replicate some of the traditional mechanisms by re-
questing offenders to compensate for the stolen cattle. Implementation of these initiatives 
has, however, been undermined by the lack of follow-up and accountability on the part of 
the government and relevant stakeholders.  
55  This include interactions with community members in Central and Eastern Equatoria Sta-
tes (in November 2010), as well as in Upper Nile and Unity States (in the period between 
2007-2009).  
56  According to the UN capstone doctrine, UN multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations 
should play a ‗catalytic‘ role in peacebuilding activities (de Coning et al., 2008:3). UN 
peacekeeping is also described as ‗early peacebuilding‘, aimed at laying the foundation 
for sustainable peace and legitimate governance. One of the core peacebuilding objectives 
in the UN Secretary-General‘s report on ‗peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict‘ is ‗support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclu-
sive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national 
and subnational levels‘ (UNSG 2009b: 6). Other priorities include: support to basic safety 
and security; provision of basic services; restoring core government functions; and 
economic revitalization. The SG report further calls for enhanced coordination between 
the various peacebuilding actors, as well as ‗early agreement on priorities and alignment 
of resources behind them‘ (ibid: 4).  
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However, the non-implementing mandates of UNMIS civilian compo-
nents, combined with the lack of synergies within UNMIS as well as 
between the mission and other UN and non-UN implementing organi-
zations, have contributed to impede the mission‘s impact in these ini-
tiatives. The lack of access to remote and conflict-prone areas also ap-
pears to have undermined the mission‘s ability to identify relevant lo-
cal stakeholders as well as to monitor and support the implementation 
and follow up of local peacebuilding efforts. Although the mission, 
through the Civil Affairs section, has facilitated a number of ‗grass-
roots‘ peace conferences, this has rarely resulted in tangible and dura-
ble results on the ground due to ‗top-down imposed agreements‘ and 
lack of ‗sustained engagement‘ (see UNMIS 2010b:3). Moreover, 
while increasingly recognizing the importance of integrating macro – 
and micro – level peacebuilding, the UN HQ and mission leadership 
has focused most of its attention and resources on the implementation 
of the broader political mandate of the mission (in support of the 
CPA) at the expense of local peace – and conflict prevention initia-
tives57.  
 
Meanwhile, most UN agencies, INGOs, and donors have, since the 
signing of the CPA, continued their war-time focus on humanitarian 
responses at the cost of investing in longer-term peacebuilding and 
development initiatives58. As a result, the international community has 
tended to treat the ‗symptoms‘ – instead of the addressing the underly-
ing causes of the violent conflicts manifested at the local level. There 
has further been a tendency to justify the lack of interventions by re-
ferring to the ‗violent culture‘ and rigid traditional values and practic-
es of the south Sudanese. This underplays the role and ability of the 
international community to assist the local communities and authori-
ties in finding solutions, and responsibility is handed over to the civil-
ian population (see also Pantuliano et al. 2008 and Autesserre 2009).   
 
The disconnect between the wider protection discourse, actual practice 
and local needs thus draws attention to the more general problem of 
how and why the international protection actors on the ground are fail-
ing to address the concerns identified by the local communities59.  
 
                                                 
57  See also Autesserre (2009) for a critique of the international peacebuilders neglect of local 
conflicts in DRC. In the case of UNMIS, however, the leadership increasingly recognized 
the critical need for conflict prevention initiatives at the local level in order to consolidate 
overall peace and stability in South Sudan, as well as to facilitate the implementation of 
the CPA (i.e. elections, referendum etc).  
58  This is with the exception of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). The 
agency has several programmes ongoing in the area of crisis prevention and recovery; 
democratic governance; poverty reduction/achieving the millennium development goals; 
and in the area of environment and energy for sustainable development. An assessment of 
these initiatives is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
59 This also highlights the need for further research on the local communities‘ own perspec-
tives on protection, including their concerns and perceptions on the appropriateness of the 
activities carried out by the international community. This is critical in order to ensure 
that protection activities carried out by the international community are responding to the 
actual needs on the ground.  
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The above findings illuminate a discrepancy between local concerns 
and what the protection community has to offer. We have also noted 
the disjuncture within the protection community, not only by degrad-
ing a concerted approach, but also in constituting a battlefield over 
what protection is and ought to be. Moreover, instead of harmonizing 
the various protection efforts, international protection actors have 
tended to approach protection within the backdrop of their respective 
institutional mandates. This has often resulted in unilateral, top-heavy 
and ad hoc, non-specific approaches at the expense of local concerns 
and needs.   
 
In South Sudan, there has further been a tendency by the international 
community to concentrate its efforts on short-term humanitarian needs 
at the cost of long-term peace- and development initiatives. According 
to Gunnar Sørbø, ‗an approach to peacebuilding is required that can 
address multiple arenas and sources of conflict in a more integrated 
way, including concern with poverty, land issues and livelihood sup-
port. This has been slow to emerge in the post-war reconstruction of 
Sudan for various reasons‘ (Sørbø 2010: 183).  
 
The failure of the international community to adequately address the 
protection concerns identified by the local communities could be re-
lated to their complex and deep-rooted causes, which call for long-
term commitment, extensive resources, continuous follow up, special-
ized capacities, presence in remote locations and knowledge of the 
local context, as well as unified efforts across the political, security, 
human rights, humanitarian, and development range of the UN family 
and partners.  
 
As illustrated in the above analysis, the lack of a coordinated approach 
on the part of the international community can be attributed to the ab-
sence of a common conceptual and operational understanding of pro-
tection – including the lack of a coherent protection strategy and 
guidelines as to the interface between the various protection actors. 
The different organizational structures, heavy bureaucracy and limited 
flexibility, as well as turf battles and the conflicting mandates between 
UNMIS and the humanitarian community, have all contributed to this 
lack of integration.  
 
Our findings from Bor further corroborate previous research findings 
regarding the prevalence of diverging understandings of protection 
and its meaning in practice within the various protection entities, in-
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cluding the humanitarian community and UNMIS respectively. This 
has also undermined the effectiveness of protection initiatives on the 
ground.  
 
In the case of UNMIS, there is further a huge gap between the PoC 
discourse at the UN Security Council level in New York, and the per-
ceptions and local realities in South Sudan. The diverging conceptions 
between the UN Security Council and UNMIS must be seen in rela-
tion to the abstract and broad protection language in the mandate, 
leaving the interpretation of the mandate in the hands of the mission 
leadership and military contingent commanders. While this could have 
brought more contextualized and appropriate responses to protection 
concerns, the available resources and capacities of the mission, have 
proven insufficient for effectively meeting actual needs on the ground. 
Hence, while mandates ought to be realistic, flexible, and imple-
mentable at the same time, they also need to be matched with ade-
quate resources, capabilities, and political support60.  
 
Moreover, as extensively discussed in the previous sections, the pre-
vailing tension within the dual mandate of the mission seems to influ-
ence the decisions by the mission leadership and military commanders 
on whether or not to intervene to protect the civilian population. The 
prevailing mindset among many military peacekeepers and complex 
chain of command, combined with the lack of a military doctrine and 
clear operational guidelines, has further impeded timely and appropri-
ate interventions on the ground. 
 
Despite these constraints, the UN Security Council did not change its 
PoC discourse, but instead accelerated its pressure on the mission to 
make more efficient use of its capabilities to implement the PoC man-
date, without providing the necessary political and financial support – 
or fully taking the primary responsibility of the host government into 
account. This has led to unrealistic expectations among the host gov-
ernment and local communities regarding the UN‘s role and responsi-
bility in providing protection to the civilian population. The perceived 
failure of the UN to meet these expectations could have serious reper-
cussions for the operations and credibility of UN missions in the fu-
ture (see UN, 2008). In Jonglei state, this has already resulted in grow-
ing negative sentiments against the UN in some areas. However, un-
less the UN Security Council and Member States politically commit to 
their calls for greater mission focus on PoC, by providing the neces-
sary resources and political backing, the mission‘s ability to protect 
civilians will remain limited.  
 
                                                 
60  The need for mandates reflecting clear and achievable tasks is also laid out in the UN 
New Horizon document (UN 2009).  
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The UN New Horizon Initiative (UN 2009) has called for an expan-
sion of the peacekeeping partnership, including an extension of the 
contributor base to UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
Broadly speaking, UN Member States are divided into two main cate-
gories: 1) the ones who make financial contributions, i.e. wealthy de-
mocracies in the North, and 2) the ones who make troop contributions, 
i.e. countries from the Global South. The first category, basing its val-
ue system on Western notions on protection and human rights, have 
been at the forefront of shaping and setting the PoC agenda at the Se-
curity Council, while the latter, in many cases not subscribing to the 
same standards and values of the West, are tasked to implement this 
agenda, as dictated by Western Member States, on the ground.  
 
This gap, however, needs to be bridged if the UN Security Council 
and Member States are committed to improve the performance of UN 
peacekeeping operations. Through troop contributions, Member States 
from the North would be better informed of the complex realities and 
demands on the ground when setting the PoC agenda, including opera-
tional tasks and standards. At the same time, this could encourage  
experienced TCCs from the Global South to meet the expected opera-
tional standards and perform more pro-actively to ensure effective de-
livery on mandated tasks. This would further send a strong message 
regarding the West‘s political commitment to UN peacekeeping in  
Africa – and not exclusively to [NATO] military operations in areas of 
strategic and geopolitical interest. By contributing with troops, smaller 
Member States in the North, like Norway, could further set an impor-
tant precedent and be in a much stronger position to engage in and in-
fluence policy processes concerning PoC and peacekeeping at the 
highest level. Moreover, until Western Member States contribute with 
their own troops to UN peacekeeping, it is not reasonable to expect 
TCCs from the Global South to risk the lives of their troops in the 
name of PoC.  
 
Meanwhile, to move forward, the policy discussions on the role of UN 
peacekeeping missions in PoC will have to go beyond questions of 
financial and political commitment by the UN Security Council and 
Member States. Given the high threshold to the use of force, there is a 
need to explore how peacekeepers, within the limitations of the con-
straining environment, can improve their operational capabilities and 
protect civilians without using lethal force. The mission in South Su-
dan could arguably make more efficient use of its resources and capa-
cities by concentrating its efforts on preventive initiatives, i.e. through 
conflict management, early warning mechanisms, flexible deployment 
of forces, as well as capacity building of local authorities and state se-
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curity forces61. Further to the need for advanced equipment and train-
ing of TCC troops, this will, however, require fundamental changes in 
the mindsets of the military commanders, necessitating in-depth con-
sultations and binding agreements between the UN Secretariat and 
TCCs on operational requirements and performance expectations prior 
to the deployment of their contingents. The success of these initiatives 
will also depend on the support and direction taken by the mission 
leadership as well as the capabilities of the civilian and police compo-
nents of the mission.  
 
It remains, however, to be seen whether the UN Security Council and 
Western Member States, as well as the humanitarian community and 
human rights advocates, will be willing to change the current dis-
course on PoC according to the long-term needs of the host country 
and realities on the ground. Eventually, the debate on PoC needs to 
raise the more fundamental question as to whether the focus should 
remain on the UNs capability to protect – or if it should shift towards 
how the UN better can enable the government in protecting its own 
citizenry62.  
 
The deteriorating security situation in South Sudan, including regular 
threats and violations against the civilian population, is causing con-
cerns over the government‘s capability to provide protection and secu-
rity to its citizenry. In the coming period, it is therefore imperative that 
the international community accelerate its assistance to the Govern-
ment of South Sudan in the highly complex and challenging state – 
and peacebuilding process, with a special focus on long-term institu-
tion – and capacity building initiatives, including support to justice 
and security sector reform and conflict management capacities at the 
national and local level. Investments in strong and durable partner-
ships with local stakeholders, including civil society actors, is further 
required throughout this process. In the longer term, the government‘s 
perceived political inclusiveness and ability to provide security and 
safety, services, and socio-economic development to the local popula-
tion, will to a great extent inform the prospects for durable peace and 
stability in South Sudan.  
 
Expectations among the host government and local communities to 
the new UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which 
replaced UNMIS on 9 July 2011, are already huge63. The weak ca-
                                                 
61  This will require joint efforts by the military, police and civilian components of the mis-
sion, in partnership with other UN and non-UN actors. 
62  The ‗Report of the UN Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict‘ highlights the importance of ‗national ownership‘ and capacity development 
from the onset to ensure sustainable peace in post-conflict situations (UNSGb 2009).  
63  UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), mandating the United Nations Mission in 
the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), was passed on 8 July 2011. Acting under Chap-
ter VII, UNMISS will consist of 7000 military personnel (with a possible reduction to 
6000), up to 900 civilian police personnel, and an appropriate civilian component.  
UNMISS has been mandated to ‗consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the 
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pacities of the government and volatile situation on the ground are ne-
cessitating enhanced efforts by the international community, including 
the UN, to assist the government in protecting the civilian population 
in the next period. There is, however, a need to be realistic about what 
the UN actually can achieve. Moreover, to ensure greater sustainabil-
ity and impact on the ground, the international community, in coop-
eration with national and local partners, should focus its protection 
initiatives on prevention and management of conflicts, as well as ef-
forts to support and enable the government to take on its primary re-
sponsibility to protect its citizenry.  
 
                                                 
conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening 
the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and 
democratically‘ (UNSCR 1996 2011: 3). On protection of civilians, the broad and manda-
tory language of ‗protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence‘ is in-
cluded in the resolution, with an emphasis on proactive deployment and patrols in areas of 
high risk of conflict (ibid: 3 (b) (v)). Further, UNMISS is authorized to ‗use all necessary 
means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to 
carry out its protection mandate‘ (ibid: 4).The PoC approach differs, however, from pre-
vious Security Council mandates, in that it puts an emphasis on conflict prevention and 
capacity building through an integrated strategy of the mission in support of the govern-
ment. As the mandate is yet to be translated into practice, it would be premature to make 
an assessment of the potential implications on the ground. However, a few preliminary 
remarks can be made. While the new PoC mandate of UNMISS appears to be more flexi-
ble and realistic than the previous UNMIS mandate, the success of the new approach will 
to a great extent depend on the resources, structure, composition and capability of the 
mission (military, police and civilian), effective cooperation with UN and non-UN part-
ners, its ability to deploy an effective early warning system, the mindset of the military 
contingents, as well as the consent of the government to grant the mission the requisite 
space to operate and the freedom to move across South Sudan. Finally, while the Security 
Council has authorized UNMISS under Chapter VII, this may not have any significant 
implications for the operations on the ground. UNMISS, with similar troop strength as 
UNMIS (in the South), will also depend on good relations and cooperation with the go-
vernment in order to operate effectively in South Sudan. The Chapter VII mandate could, 
however, raise false expectations as to the ‗robustness‘ of the mission in terms of its ca-
pability to protect civilians.   
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